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Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to discuss the extent to which the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) can be an effective instrument furthering democratic changes, market reforms and modernization processes in the CIS countries 1 .
The main motivation for raising such a question is the experience of EU enlargement waves and in particular the accession process of the Central and East European (CEE) countries that joined the block in 2004 and 2007. For these countries, the EU accession process (that started in the 1990s) coincided with a major modernization and reform effort. The clearly defined final objective of EU membership and the fact that realization of this objective depended on fulfilling a number of membership criteria (requiring implementation of certain reforms and policy measures) is commonly believed to have been instrumental in speeding up the reform process and improving its effectiveness (Dąbrowski and Radziwiłł, 2007; Schweickert et al., 2008 , ECFIN, 2009 . With the ENP borrowing certain elements from the enlargement process ("a stake in the EU's Internal Market"), but EU membership not on offer ("everything but institutions"), the question of what this policy can actually achieve is a valid one.
The paper starts by reviewing the evidence on external anchors for reforms. The second section briefly introduces the ENP, presenting it as a part of EU policy towards the CIS region. Then follows a more detailed discussion of the factors shaping the evolution of the ENP and the environment in which its reform-promoting channels can work. The next section asks whether there is already enough evidence to base a solid opinion on the effectiveness of the ENP in supporting policy change. Conclusions are accompanied by recommendations that are mainly directed at the EU side.
External anchors supporting reforms
Reforms processes in developing and transition countries have in various ways been supported externally. These measures have taken the form of budgetary support, policy advice, funding for specific projects, possibly accompanied by certain conditions, etc. Clearly, any progress in reforms strongly depends on the internal political situation, interests and relative strength of various stakeholder groups. An important question is how internal policy dynamics interact with external reform support. The influences can go both ways. External actors may see their assistance projects missing targets due to opposition from interest groups and on the other hand external influences can change the preferences of domestic players, enabling an improvement in some aspects of governance.
It is useful here to make a distinction between the simple conditionality that has been present in several international aid and stabilisation programmes (e.g. with the IMF) and the "external anchoring" of reforms that Dąbrowski and Radziwiłł (2007) define as actions promoting both the supply of and genuine demand for reforms. The key point here is that the latter implies reform ownership and commitment on the side of the country concerned, i.e. crucial elements increasing the likelihood of reform success and sustainability (World Bank, 2008 ).
There exists a large body of empirical work studying the role of external inducement on domestic reforms. One important strand of the literature has focused on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Easterly (2006) provides an overview of this literature and himself offers a rather pessimistic view on aid effectiveness. Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008) provide a metaanalysis of close to 100 studies looking at aid as a treatment given to poor countries to generate development. They find that the average of estimates of aid effects on growth is positive among studies that provide numerical values, which, albeit is insignificant and falling.
Furthermore, the authors reveal that publication outlet and institutional affiliation appear to be related to the magnitude of the reported effects.
The effectiveness of development assistance is the key concern of major international donors. Their focus is on practical lessons that can be applied to improving aid effectiveness.
Recent analyses in this sphere (see e.g. World Bank, 2008 , and references therein) have underlined the importance of political economy aspects of interventions. One key lesson emerging from this work is that development assistance projects should carefully account for local political realities. Reform interventions should be fitted to the relevant political economy just as they (obviously) need to take into account real economy characteristics. The focus is thus on adjusting interventions to local realities rather than trying simply to use external motivation or pressure to foster changes.
Another interesting perspective on the same question is provided by analysis of the perceptions of stakeholders directly involved in the technical assistance projects. One of the findings from stakeholder surveys is that several respondents do see a direct and positive link between the lack of any political agenda in technical assistance projects and their success (Mogilevsky and Atamanov, 2008) . The relatively good assessment of projects funded by the government of Switzerland, for example, was linked to the perceived lack of any explicit or hidden political agenda. While technical assistance projects have some specific features, as discussed by Mogilevsky and Atamanov (2008) , which limits the possibilities for generalization of these results, it still signals another aspect of external actions theoretically aimed at reform promotion, i.e. political motivations and constraints from the side offering assistance.
Overall, it is fair to conclude that the evidence that foreign aid has provided good incentives to adopt good policy is mixed at best.
Given their specific features, IMF programmes can be analysed separately from development assistance. Also in this case there is no clear consensus as to the effectiveness of conditionality present e.g. in the IMF programmes on improved policy outcomes. The relatively optimistic view of Ghosh et al. (2005) contrasts with negative assessments from Barro and Lee (2005) and Easterly (2006) . Alesina et al. (2006) find at best weak effects of IMF programmes on macroeconomic stabilizations (fiscal adjustments or anti-inflationary measures). Similarly, conclusions on the effectiveness of conditionality related to the WTO accession process vary. Rose (2004) considers WTO commitments to be irrelevant in fostering trade. Tang and Wei (2008) conclude that WTO/GATT accessions between 1990
and 2001 had a significant, albeit transitory, effect on growth in acceding countries that were subject to rigorous accession procedures.
Views on the effects of the EU accession process in supporting wide-ranging reforms are more upbeat (see Schweickert et al., (2008) and references therein). Dąbrowski and Radziwiłł (2007) conclude that the EU, through the Eastern enlargement process, acted as the very effective mechanism supporting reforms. In particular, the consolidation phase of democratization, institution building and structural transformation was successful in countries reforming under EU accession conditionality. The authors share the negative assessment of the effectiveness of IMF-type conditionality in this context. They also argue that EU-related trade liberalization had stronger effects than WTO-related trade measures and that policies aimed at macroeconomic stability also tended to be more effective in the environment of EU integration than under IMF programs. Dąbrowski and Radziwiłł (2007) propose an explanation of the much stronger effects of EU accession conditionality relative to IMF-type programs, indicating the strength of the incentives, broader scope of and stronger public support for conditions and a better monitoring framework (Table 1) . The widely perceived attractiveness of and thus strong public support for the ultimate objective, i.e. EU membership, is particularly important. The IMF (2003) suggest yet another mechanism reinforcing this mechanism. Competition among EU candidate countries and ease of comparisons with direct neighbours acted as an additional stimulus for reforms. An example is provided by experiences of Latvia and Lithuania after these countries were not included in the group of the first six countries that commenced EU accession negotiations in 1997, while their Baltic neighbour Estonia was included. A similar argument could be used with respect to Slovakia, which following a period of populist policies until 1998 and subsequently managed to catch up with and surpass most of its Central and Eastern European neighbours as far as economic reforms were concerned 2 .
The IMF (2003) also points to the fact that EU accession negotiations provided detailed blueprints for reforms, effectively limiting the scope for bargaining by interest groups.
Candidate countries simply had to deal with specific obligations related to trade policy (the common external tariff and other requirements for the customs union), full opening of the capital account and minimum standards associated with the European Social Charter.
An important point is that in order for such a mechanism to work, the institutional / policy blueprints have to reasonably correspond to development level, political, social and cultural models and the experiences of any particular country. The new EU member countries (that joined in 2004 and 2007) , despite some obvious differences with western European countries (notably the communist experiences of the post-WWII period) have indeed been in many respects similar to other EU member states, e.g. with regard to economic and social developments before WWII, prevailing social norms, etc. Such proximity (in a broad sense)
was arguably an important element in the reform process and indeed was a precondition for EU membership to be a widely popular objective shared by a large majority of the populations and political elites. Besides, this increased the chances that the EU policy blueprint was actually the right choice to follow in these countries and in the period when it was applied. This may not always be the case and indeed there are examples where external policy advice underpinned by conditionality mechanisms might have locked in suboptimal policy choices (Antczak et al, 2003) .
Political economy models of reform vary depending on the characteristics of the concerned markets, policy changes and interest groups. This also applies to external influences. Boeri (2005) evaluates European structural reforms in labour and product markets over the past two decades. He concludes that reforms in labour markets are occurring at higher frequencies than in product markets, while product market reforms are found to be more coherent. Boeri proposes an explanation for these patterns in differences in the character of political obstacles to reforms in the two domains. In the labour market it is easier to exploit institutional trade-offs and follow a strategy concentrating regulatory changes on new entrants who are less likely to oppose them. This marginal reform strategy is infeasible in product markets. However, in product markets it is easier to shift responsibilities to supranational authorities, resisting the pressures of national lobbies (by being able to blame someone else).
From the perspective of this paper, it is crucial to understand the limits of an external anchor as catalysts for economic transition. A mechanism similar to the one that materialized during the EU accession process required a certain minimum level of governance built on cultural belief systems, ethical norms and conventions, etc. (Ahrens, 2006; Wagener, 2004 While the ENP is a well defined policy in itself, for analytical purposes it may actually be justified to treat the ENP as a part of the overall EU's strategy towards the CIS region (or rather certain sub-regions). There are several reasons why such an approach is more reasonable (and is adopted in this paper).
Firstly, the ENP has not been created in a vacuum and has in fact been built upon already existing sets of relations with CIS countries (see Light, 2007, for a historical account Relations between the EU and CIS countries are, to a large extent, shaped by policy continuity and routine with incorporated elements previously applied in the EU enlargement process (Delcour, 2007 The key question is whether the ENP offer to the countries involved has a chance of being sufficiently attractive. In economic terms, participating countries are promised a chance of obtaining "a stake in the Internal Market". This is a potentially meaningful concept as it implies that ENP countries can gradually strengthen their economic integration with the EU and benefit from selected elements of the Internal Market. The full participation in the Internal and that would in practical terms be a somewhat limited version of the European
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Experience with implementation of Action Plans to date suggests that each of the above steps is likely to take several years, assuming strong reform commitment on the side of the ENP countries. The process is gradual, with few spectacular milestones that can be easily observed by the general public that can serve as an indication of policy success. In the case of the EU accession process during the 1990s and early 2000s, the signing of the Europe Agreements or Association Agreements, the start of the accession negotiations and finally EU enlargement provided such benchmarks. This feature of the ENP weakens its reform anchoring potential. On the other hand, the economic content of the EU offer is very significant. Hence, it may turn out that ENP attractiveness and its reform anchoring potential will depend on the ability of stakeholders to understand the potential benefits and on the information / presentation strategy to reach the general public.
Going beyond the ENP, the following points are important for understanding EU relations with other CIS partners. Belarus's inclusion in the ENP hinges on the country taking some more convincing steps towards democratization, respect for human rights and the rule of law, as defined by the European Commission's document "What the EU could bring to Belarus", released in 2006 6 . This case, therefore, can be to some extent treated as a test for the attractiveness as the ENP per se as the EU conditional offer to Belarus consists of reengaging in the ENP framework.
EU relations with Russia are driven mainly by the economic and political interests of both sides and the EU does not have much leverage (or indeed willingness) in persuading Russia 5 A vision of four such steps is presented e.g. in the 2006 non-paper "ENP -A Path Towards Further Economic Integration", available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-paper_economic-integration_en.pdf. 6 The documents is available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/intro/non_paper_1106.pdf.
to implement particular reforms. On the other hand, the practical realities of economic cooperation create incentives on the Russian side for some regulatory convergence with EU standards.
Relations with Central Asian countries have since 2008 been carried out under the new heading of the "Strategy for a New Partnership". Given their distance from the EU and historical developments, the EU is not among the key external players in Central Asian countries. Still, its role in supporting certain reforms in Central Asia is probably greater than is visible at first sight (Gortat, 2007) .
Forces shaping EU-CIS relations and the EU's Eastern policy
The relative effectiveness of external pressures on reform processes depends crucially on the underlying social, economic and political realities and the configuration of interests and powers of the key stakeholders. This section discusses the situation in this respect, first in the CIS countries and then on the EU side.
The situation in the CIS countries
Different stakeholders in CIS countries (ruling elites, other political forces, business community and population at large) differ in respect to knowledge about, interest in and attitudes towards the EU and its policies towards the CIS region or specific countries. This affects the process of shaping bilateral relations between the EU and respective CIS countries and also the potential role of the ENP as a reform-promoting mechanism.
Assessing practical knowledge of the EU and its modes of operations among the ruling elites and administrations of CIS countries is not easy. An indirect indication of problems in this sphere can be drawn from the generally low quality of governance in the CIS countries (see e.g. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2008) , signalling, inter alia, limited capacity among governing circles. The size of the countries also matters here and e.g. Russia clearly has a much stronger capacity and expertise in European issues than most other countries 7 . The often prevailing passive approach of some CIS governments to dialogue with the EU, where 7 Light (2007) shows examples of Russian initiatives vis-à-vis the EU and suggests that one factor strengthening the Russian position relative to other CIS countries is that it "inherited" the Soviet Union's relations with the EU, including a large part of its diplomatic personnel and infrastructure.
the CIS side confines itself to responding to EU initiatives but not coming up with its own proposals, may also suggest limited know-how as to effective mechanisms for approaching the EU (Menkiszak et al, 2008) .
On the business side, it appears that only the largest companies involved in trade and investment in the EU have the capacity to monitor relevant developments and lobby for favourable solutions. Another complication is that the mechanisms of transparent and effective stakeholder consultation are not developed in CIS countries. As a result, CIS businesses may have limited opportunities to learn about likely outcomes of any planned decisions or agreements (e.g. negotiations on free trade agreements with the EU) and articulate their interests (Shumylo, 2006) . At the same time, some business lobbies in CIS countries are very powerful and able to affect domestic policies, including areas that are critical from the perspective of relations with the EU. Kolesnichenko (2007) Interpretation of these data is, however, complicated by lack of appropriate benchmarks. In particular it is not obvious which aspects of knowledge about the EU are most important.
Such difficulties in studying knowledge about the EU among its citizens are discussed by Sinnott (1997) Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. In the first two countries, 50-60% of respondents declare at least some support for the idea of EU membership and this share is broadly stable over time.
In Russia, the 2005 results were similar to the ones in the other two countries, but by 2008 the support has decreased. In all cases negative attitudes are expressed by a rather small share of respondents, while many find it difficult to answer or decline to answer. European strategy that could be effectively implemented.
While the ENP is a bilateral policy instrument where CIS countries are able to shape their relations with the EU, the degree of co-operation or conflict between CIS countries matters in terms of the quality of their dialogue with the EU. This is because of the similarity of problems faced by CIS partners, the large role of economic and political co-operation between CIS countries and the importance of fields of relations where more than one CIS partner is essential. The Russian-Ukrainian row over gas supplies in January 2009 (and earlier similar cases) illustrates the point and this can be expected to make EU relations more difficult with both Ukraine and Russia. A detailed analysis of intra-CIS relations is beyond the scope of this analysis. Clearly, however, there are serious tensions between several countries and intra-regional integration initiatives (including the CIS itself) have remained mainly at the declaratory stage without providing any effective platform for solving problems that arise (Konończuk, 2007 This special position of Russia makes it an alternative to the EU (and most often a stronger) pole of attraction in the strategic foreign policy choices of CIS countries. The importance and attractiveness of Russia does not necessarily imply that "Western" (EU) and "Eastern" 
The situation in EU countries
Among the factors shaping the EU's offer towards the ENP and other CIS countries, the heterogeneity of EU member states' interests towards the region and towards particular CIS countries plays a very important role. Dura (2008) outlines and analyses this complicated picture. He claims that the overarching interest is of an economic nature, related to energy imports from the region and market access. Security and immigration issues also rank high on the list, whereas EU countries are less concerned with democratization trends in the CIS.
Cultural closeness and a common history still play a large part in the development of bilateral relations 14 . There are also complex interrelations where, for example, the type of bilateral relations of a given EU member country with one CIS sub-region also affects its relations 12 IISEPS, Geopolitical coordinates of Belarus. The figures cited in the text refer to the survey carried out in December 2008. In comparison to a survey from May 2007 a number of respondents choosing Russia increased slightly. More than one answer was possible in this question. 13 IPP (2008) . Respondents were asked the question: "Which of the following states could help the Republic of Moldova most in the process of accession to the EU, in your opinion?" Romania was indicated by 41% of respondents, Russia by 24% and no other country got more than 4%. 14 For a case study on the effects of common language and history on political relations see Korkut (2008 (Eurobarometer, 2006) . Ukraine (57%), Russia (55%) and Belarus (49%) were indicated most often, but also other CIS countries were mentioned more frequently than several Southern Mediterranean countries: Moldova (37%), Georgia (29%), Armenia (23%), Kazakhstan (16%) compared to Morocco (28%), Tunisia (24%) and Algeria (20%) 16 . These perceptions are mainly driven by geographical proximity, with citizens of EU member states bordering particular non-EU countries perceiving these as "EU neighbours" far more often than citizens of more distant EU member states.
As regards EU citizens' interest in developments in the EU neighbourhood, as the same 2007 survey (Eurobarometer, 2007) shows, a slight majority indicated little or no interest (54%), while 44% said they were interested. Interpretation of whether this indicates much or little interest is difficult. One interesting observation is that, on average, citizens of more affluent EU member states tend to declare a stronger interest in the EU neighbourhood than citizens of less developed member states.
EU relations with neighbouring countries are perceived as "good" by a large majority (67%) of EU citizens. A large majority of respondents is also convinced that it is important for the EU to develop specific relations with neighbouring countries in areas such as fighting 15 The following paragraphs partly draw from Konieczna (2008) . 16 The question did not seek an opinion on Azerbaijan.
organized crime and terrorism, the environment and energy, economic development, democracy, education and training and immigration 17 .
The Eurobarometer survey (2007) contains several direct questions exploring the opinions on the reform-promoting objectives of the ENP. One in two EU citizens believes that neighbouring countries are willing to cooperate with the EU in order to introduce reforms (49%), while 30% disagreed with this statement. There is a large heterogeneity of answers between EU member states, with citizens of the new EU member states revealing a much stronger belief as to the will to go ahead with reform cooperation on the side of EU neighbours than the EU average. There also seems to be quite a strong support for conditionality in the EU relations with neighbours. 63% of respondents agreed with a statement that "the EU should reduce its relations with the neighbouring countries that show no willingness to progress", and only 25% disagreed. Figure 2 shows interesting results concerning the perceived gains and risks related to EU engagement with its neighbours. Substantial majority of EU citizens tends to believe that "helping" EU neighbouring countries would be ensuring also the EU's prosperity and reduce the risk of conflicts in Europe. They also believe that this "help" is bound to be very costly in financial terms. At the same time when confronted with a question whether "promoting reforms could endanger our own peace and stability" the slight majority is actually wiling to agree with this statement. This somewhat paradoxical results, most likely, from different popular connotation of the word "help" comparing to "promoting reforms" (the former being considered nicer than the latter). An alternative interpretation saying that EU citizens are indeed worried about the reform-promoting role of the ENP would appear at least partly inconsistent with quite a strong belief that neighbouring countries are willing to cooperate with the EU in order to introduce reforms (see above).
Similarity of norms and values
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As indicated above, some degree of similarity in major underlying values, belief systems, ethical norms and cultural conventions may be a precondition for effective co-operation between EU and CIS countries. In this section we provide some evidence with regard to convergence or divergence in this sphere. Eurobarometer (2006 Eurobarometer ( , 2007 surveys confirm the existence of a fairly well defined set of values that are associated with the European Union. These are human rights, democracy and peace, possibly also the market economy. There is quite strong homogeneity among EU member states with regard to this opinion. When asked whether neighbouring countries (defined as countries covered by the ENP) share most of these so defined EU values a significant majority of EU citizens disagrees (57%) and only 30% believe that ENP countries share European values. On the other hand, interpretation of this result should take into account that EU citizens are also not particularly strongly convinced that EU members states are close to each other in terms of shared values. 48% of respondents agree with this statement, but 41% believe that EU countries are distant from each other on this score.
Several indications on attitudes towards democracy in the EU and CIS countries can be found in the results of World Values Survey (E&WVS, 2006) . Figure 3 shows the heterogeneity of responses to questions on the relative merits of the democratic system and on the preferences as to which system would be best for respondents' own countries. This suggests that EU15 countries appear to be characterized by significantly stronger support for democracy (on both counts) than new EU member states and CIS countries. The difference between NMS and CIS countries is less pronounced. This observation can be supported also by other results from the same survey. Respondents in CIS countries are significantly more likely than EU citizens to believe that among the possible ways of governing the country, "army rule" or "a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" could be good options. At the same time, "a democratic political system" is considered a good option by a large majority of respondents in all countries, albeit also here the level of support among respondents in CIS countries is somewhat lower than in the EU. Attitudes towards the market economy are typically analyzed based on surveys asking questions regarding some aspects of the free market, such as competition, the state and private ownership in business, etc. The advantage of such an indirect approach is that the term "market economy" itself can be differently understood by respondents with different historical and cultural backgrounds. Figure 4 summarizes the findings on approaches to the market economy. Support for economic competition turns out to be quite similar across the studied regions at around 50%.
The differences between regions (with EU15 respondents being least supportive) are not statistically significant. The studied regions, however, differ in attitudes towards the role of government in the economy. In the CIS countries there is far more support for a state ownership and control role than in the EU. As far as the state's controlling role is concerned,
the actual boundary appears to be between the EU15 on the one side and NMS and direct EU eastern neighbours on the other. Note: *) the question regarding support for state control over business was not asked in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. In each case respondents were asked to make a choice on a scale from 1 to 10 with the extreme values identified with opposite opinions: e.g. 1 "competition is good" and 10 "competition is harmful"; 1 "Private ownership of business should be increased" and 10 "Government ownership of business should be increased"; 1 "State should give more freedom to firms" and 10 "State should control firms more effectively". 
Evidence on the ENP's impact
Identification of the ENP's impact on the policies and economic, social and institutional changes in the ENP countries is difficult. The major reason for this is that the ENP is a relatively new instrument, given that Action Plans with Ukraine and One approach for identifying the ENP's effects or, more broadly, EU influence on domestic policy developments in CIS countries is though in-depth studies tracing particular incentives or advice offered by the EU and its effects in a given country. Schweickert et al. (2008) focus on the experience of three countries covered by the ENP:
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine. They conclude that reform progress (in both the economic and political spheres) in Ukraine and Georgia are mainly due to the domestic-driven motivation of the elites. The ENP's role is of a catalyst, but not a basic mechanism of the Europeanization process. The authors also point to the strikingly different effectiveness of the incentives provided by potential access to the EU market. The observation here is that only some CIS countries (primarily Ukraine and Moldova) have realistic chances in this sphere and thus that this channel of influence is only really working there. Kolesnichenko (2007) identifies the role of business in promoting the reform agenda due to its (selective) interests in economic integration and access to the EU market (this point is also discussed by Schweickert et al., 2008) . Rakova (2008) does not find evidence for EU influences on Belarusian economic policy. This is because of the official position of the authorities, which is at odds with the primary values and goals that the ENP is meant to promote. Still, the author believes that the ENP could provide a framework supporting reforms in the future, provided Belarus is first attracted or motivated to more seriously engage with the EU.
Gortat (2007) 
Conclusions and recommendations
The question of the ENP's effectiveness in fostering economic reforms in CIS partner countries can be approached from various perspectives. Attempts to devise ideal models for the ENP that would abstract from political realities both in the EU and in CIS countries is probably of little practical interest. Taking into account existing limitations leads to less exciting but potentially more reasonable conclusions.
This paper claims that it is yet too early to assess the actual success of the ENP in the sphere of promoting economic policy changes in the eastern neighbourhood countries. The actual progress of the ENP agenda has been limited to date, due to a variety of factors, both on the EU and CIS sides. While country case studies do find examples of positive influences of EU policies towards particular CIS countries and simple comparative analyses suggest that the ENP may have neutral or slightly positive effects, the evidence is too weak to prove the ENP's strength in helping to promote and support sustainability of broader and deeper reforms.
The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the policy frameworks similar to the ENP in fostering economic reforms is mixed. The ENP operates in a different environment than the EU accession process in the Central and East European countries during the 1990s and early 2000s and, since EU membership is currently not a realistic option for the countries covered by the ENP, the sticks and carrots are clearly weaker. Still this does not preclude that the reform anchoring mechanism could work, given that the ENP's potential offer of "a stake in the EU Internal Market" could provide meaningful economic benefits, even if only in the longer term. Also, integration with the EU benefits from relatively strong public support in several countries covered by the ENP. This support is not significantly weaker than in the current new EU member states several years before their accession to the EU. A longer horizon of strategic planning among the leaders of CIS countries, stronger commitment to advancing real progress by the EU and wider presentation of potential ENP benefits could strengthen the reform anchoring potential of the ENP.
Several underlying factors both in the EU and in CIS countries affect the evolution of the ENP and ultimately the chances that it can effectively support positive policy changes. Some features of the ENP environment are of a permanent nature, some other may slowly evolve, others may change quite rapidly. The evolution of the factors shaping the environment for the ENP in ways that could strengthen its role should be supported whenever this is feasible.
The distance between Brussels and the capitals of CIS countries will not change in the future: Central Asian capital cities will remain roughly three times as far from Brussels as Minsk, Kiev or Chisinau, while the capitals of Caucasus countries will remain twice as far.
Some other relevant measures of distance do change, however, and with technological progress, significant convergence is likely. The price of a plane ticket between Brussels and capitals of CIS countries is already now not really dependent on the distance: travel to Almaty may cost roughly the same as a ticket to Chisinau, for example 20 . The cost and quality of communication services may soon improve significantly making a video-call between Ashgabat and Brussels as easy as between two rooms in the Commission offices.
This lends support for cooperation in the areas of broadly understood transport and communication networks.
Existing information on the values and norms that are important for societies in the EU and CIS countries confirms the existence of significant differences in some dimensions, although in many instances rather than speaking of a sharp division between EU and CIS countries another picture emerges. The level for support for democratic or free market principles tends to correlate with the geographic location along the east-west diagonal and historical experience (the duration of communist rule) with some new EU member states appearing not to be that different from some CIS countries. It may be difficult to predict the future evolution in this sphere.
The role of individual contacts among citizens of EU and CIS countries appears quite important for widening knowledge about the EU in the CIS and improving relations. This supports the view that a more friendly visa regime would be desirable. Also, the immigration policies of EU countries could be analyzed more carefully and a broader opening to labour migration could be contemplated, especially in view of long-term labour demand challenges due to ageing societies. Furthermore, support for investment in human capital in the CIS countries, e.g. by means of larger scholarship programs supporting studies and research stays abroad for promising young students and scientists should be promoted.
The perception of the ENP in CIS countries matters a lot. Therefore, allowing a real dialogue in shaping Action Plans and building implementation mechanisms, responsiveness to 20 The search for the cheapest options for a (planned well in advance) return flight from Brussels (using one of the internet services) carried in January 2009 produced the following result: tickets for Moscow, Minsk and Kiev were by far the cheapest. Reaching Tbilisi, Chisinau, Yerevan, Baku and Almaty was roughly twice as expensive. The cheapest options for other Central Asian capitals turned out to be 3-4 times as expensive. Clearly, choosing another departure point in the EU and /or other periods could produce different result.
initiatives made by CIS partners and encouragement for such initiatives where local capacity is limited should be important elements of the EU's approach.
People tend to believe -at least to some extent -what they hear and see in the media (Gentzkov and Shapiro, 2004) 21 . Well designed information campaigns about the EU, its objectives and actions, could play a positive role. Ensuring that the EU message is free from propaganda and biased views would appear important given that the ultimate objective is to encourage strengthening of long-term links with the EU, not winning an information war.
Acting towards easier access to Western news sources in the CIS region (e.g. via availability of translations or subtitles) could be effective.
The political scenes in several CIS countries may undergo substantial evolution in the coming years. However, probably only in the case of Belarus could a change of the current ruling regime lead to a more significant shift in relations with the EU. In other countries, while heterogeneity in terms of the degree of democratization and the positions of the major political forces is substantial, firstly, EU relations are not among the key dimensions of the political game and, secondly, the major factors hampering relations have more to do with limited administrative capacity and overall governance quality than to officially declared positions. One potential risk factor is related to the outcomes of the economic crisis that On the EU side, dealing with enlargement fatigue, solutions to the problem of rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, the impact of the current economic crises and progress in the EU integration process of the South-East European countries will be key factors determining the EU's commitment to the ENP and its evolution.
The ENP can be expected to work partly via the built-in conditionality mechanisms and partly via the mechanism of socialization. In practical terms, the distinction between the two may be of secondary importance. Given the very large heterogeneity between partners and wide
